The word ‘principium’, widely used in science and philosophy, is a Latin translation of the Greek word a) rxh / (?Beginning?? Beginning?? Cause?), Who from the epic poet Homer (c. 9th century BC) has become “an important term in Greek philosophy. “[1]
The Portuguese word? Beginning? Does it come from Latin?Principium? Et, corresponds, in the sense of a) rxh/Greek, when it designates a source or cause from which something comes from. [2]
- Anaximandro (610-547 BC).
- As we have seen.
- Seems to have been the “first to introduce the term principle” [3] to explain the principle of all things.
- To call it?Peiron? (a) / combed “endless”.
- “unlimited”.
- “indeterminate”.
- “indefinite”).
- The principle (a) rxh /) of all things is the?Peiron? (a) / combed ” infinite”.
- “unlimited”.
- “indeterminate”.
- “indefinite”).
- [4] In this case.
- A) /comb would basically be the “principle of reality”.
- [5].
Anaximandro points to a breakthrough over the Tales, so his response as to the origin of the universe is marked by an understanding that the primordial element, the?A) rxh /?of all things, cannot be a material element defined as air, water, earth, fire, or even a mixture of two or more of these elements. All are generated, created. So, finished. (See: Dox. , 2). His philosophy, “is the first Western attempt to explain the universe by derivation of infinity”, deduce Klimke (1878-1924) and Colomer (1924-1997). [6]
He wrote Jaeger (1888–1961), “the only one from the conception of the world from which an exact representation can be obtained. “[7] Elsewhere, Says Jaeger: “In Anaximandro, we find the first unified and universal image in the world, based on a natural inference and explanation of all phenomena. “[8]
Mora (1912-1991) notes that from the presocratic period, the word began to have two main meanings: “Principle of all things?So what do we get from all the other things?” [9].
Indeed, the predominant concern of philosophers in this period concerns cosmological issues; they wanted to liberate the wisdom of the cosmos. His attention is mainly focused on the origin, nature and transformations of the outside world [10] where he is considered to have his own vitality [11].
Here Greek Philosophy is eminently Philosophy of Nature, however, it is not limited to Nature, since when the Greeks spoke of nature, they also thought about spirit and being in general. Were they more metaphysical than physical? concluded Hirschberger (1900-1990). [12] In fact, they were not limited to sensory experience, but sought the reality of the “first cause”. However, despite the search for the “immaterial”, the truth is that they never reached the conception of “the mind”. [13]
While presocratic philosophy is intensely interested in the physical universe, it is not a monolithic bloc, with a unique perspective and similar responses, but a living thought, with prodigious conclusions, which increasingly expands the range of responses to the phenomena of nature.
Cassirer (1874-1945) summed it up well by saying that
Cosmology clearly dominates all branches of philosophical research; however, what characterizes the depth and breadth of the Greek spirit is the fact that almost all Greek thinkers represent, at the same time, a new general type of thinking. At Milet’s school, Pyragosters discovered a mathematical philosophy, while electoral thinkers were the first to conceive of the ideal of a logical philosophy. Heráclito is on the border between cosmological and anthropological thinking. [14]
Subsequently, Plato (427-347 BC), in Fedra, uses the same term to refer to the idea of movement: “The beginning is something that has not been formed, being clear that everything that is formed is formed by a principle. This principle leads to nothing, because if it came from something else, wouldn’t it be a beginning?[15]
Aristotle (384-322 BC) defined the “principle” as “what does not in itself contain what necessarily follows something else, and who, on the contrary, has something with which he is or will necessarily be united”[16].
As Bavinck points out, in Aristotle’s philosophy in general, the word refers to “the first things in a series and, in particular, to the root causes that cannot be attributed to other causes. “
Eisler (1873-1926) gives the following definition of “principle”
The principle is what gives rise to or forms the basis of thought and knowledge (real principle, principle of existence), as well as what necessarily think and knowledge rest on (principle of thought, principle of knowledge, considered as a formal and material aspect of an ideal principle); and also a fundamental point of view, i. e. a standard of action (practical principle) [18].
The ways of understanding reality have made history appear the “principle of being” (essendi principle or formal principle) and the principle of knowledge (cognoscendi principle or real principle). [19]
“Realistic” philosophers – admit the independence of being in relation to knowledge – give primacy to the “principle of being”, knowing that the principle of knowledge arises from knowledge of reality, of essence.
The? Idealists—reducing reality to thought—prioritize the “principle of knowledge,” declaring that the principles of knowledge of reality determine reality as known or cognoscible [20].
Because the existence of being itself does not depend on our knowledge?Is that what it is, regardless of our awareness of its existence?[21] and that our knowledge is only possible if there is one object, the being. [22]
Then it can be said as Fleming (1794-1866), that
The essendi principle can also be a cognoscendi principle because the fact that things exist is the basis or reason why they are known, but the opposite is not only because the existence of things does not depend in any way on our consciousness [23]. ]
The principles of non-theological sciences have something in common with the principles of theological sciences, but they also have divergent points. [24] At the moment, we must take into account that the principles of a science are its characteristic proposals that guide its research, to which, therefore, all its subsequent development is subordinated. [25] Therefore, in any approach we take, we must be aware that assumptions are fundamental factors in our focus on the subject under study [26].
[1] D. Muller, Beginning: In: Colin Brown, editor. The new International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, Sao Paulo: Vida Nova, 1981-1983, v. 1, p. 446. See: Gerhard Delling, a) rxh /, etc. : Gerhard Kittel; G. Friedrich, ed. New Testament Theological Dictionary, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1982, v. 1, 479-480; DelPeters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon, 2. Ed. Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, (1983), p. 36-38.
[2] Condillac (1714–1780) sums it up by saying, “The principle is synonymous with principle and it is with this sense that it was used from the outset: but, without the usual force, it was used mechanically, offline, and if they had principles that are not the beginning of nothing?(Etienne B. de Condillac, Logic or early developments in the art of thinking, Sao Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1973. (Thinkers, v. 27), II . 6. P. 121). However, Bavinck makes a distinction that we think is relevant: “The cause is a particular type of principium. Every cause is a principle, but isn’t it all principle a cause?(Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmática: Prolegomenos, Sao Paulo: Christian Culture, 2012, v. 1, p. 211).
[3] Simplio, Physics, 24. 13. En: Victor Civita, ed. Presocratics, Sao Paulo: Cultural April, 1973, (Os Pensadores, v. 1), p. 21. G. S. Church; JERaven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 2. ed. Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1982, p. 103-104 and Werner Jaeger, Theology of the First Greek Philosophers, Mexico: Econ-mica Culture Fund, 1992, 31ss. , Discuss whether this is the correct meaning of Theofrasto’s text (cf. Dox. , 1)
[4] Dox. , 1. 2,6. According to Anaximandro, a) / peiron is unlimited, eternal, indissoluble and indestructible (Frags. , 2. 3; Dox. , 2. 3). He directs all things (Dox. , 2. 3). It is possible that Anaximandro derived his a) / peiron from xa / oj d’Hesiod, which attributed xa / oj at the beginning of everything (Hesiod, Theogony: The Origin of the Gods, Sao Paulo: Roswitha Kempf / Editors, 1986, 116ss p. 132). For Hesiod, the xa/oj was an indefinite space between heaven and earth (see: Damio Berge, The Heraclitic Logos: Introduction to the Study of Fragments, Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1969, p. 139-140). A more complete discussion of Heráclito’s vision, we have it in GS Church; J. e. Raven, The Pres-Socratic Philosophers, 2. ed. Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1982, p. 18ss.
The? Apeiron? You have a chance to become anything. Abbagnano comments:
“If Anaximander does not find the concept of intangible space, the indeterminacy of the Apeiron, reducing it to spatiality, necessarily turns it into a body determined solely by its extension. However, this extension is infinite and as such encompasses and governs the whole. determinations and especially the first ones make the Apeiron a different and transcendent reality: what it embraces is always outside and beyond what it embraces, even in relation to it. The principle that Anaximanandre establishes as original substance deserves, therefore, the name of “Divino”. Nicola Abbagnano, History of Philosophy, 4th ed. Lisbon: Editorial Presença, (1985), v. 1, 9, p. 36. Of the same, Jaeger, when he said: “Only a God can? Govern? “(W. Jaeger, Paideia: The formation of the Greek man, 2nd ed. , Sao Paulo; Brasilia, DF. : Martins Fontes; Editora Universidade de Brasilia, 1989, p. 138)).
[5] See José Ferrater Mora, Principle: Dictionary of Philosophy, Sao Paulo: Edies Loyola, 2001, v. 3, 2371.
[6] F. Klimke; E. Colomer, Historia de la Filosofa, 3rd ed. , Torre, Barcelona, Obra Editorial, 1961, p. 22 See also, G. S. Church; J. E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p 139; F. Nietzsche, Philosophy in the tragedy of the Greeks, Sao Paulo: Cultural April (Os Pensadores, v. 32), 1974, 4, 42.
[7] Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Formation of the Greek Man, Sao Paulo; Brasilia, DF. : Martins Fontes; Universidad Editora de Brasilia, 1989, p. 136.
[8] Werner Jaeger, Theology of the First Greek Philosophers, Mexico: Economic Culture Fund, 1992, p. 29. (See: Dox. , 1, 2, 6).
[9] José F. Mora, Dictionary of Abbreviated Philosophy, Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1970, p. 342.
[10] The word used, fu/sikh, makes sense among the presocratics, of “true nature of things?”And? Origin of all things? (See: Helmut Koster, fu/sij: In: Gerhard Kittel; G. Friedrich, eds. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 8. ed. Grand Rapids, Michigan: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. , (reprinted) 1982 , v. 9, p. 252 and 256). In the Greek concept of physis, two things were inseparable: the problem of origin?What forces thought to go beyond the limits of what is given in the sensory experience?And understanding, through empirical research (histor) (?Search?,?quting?), what is derived from this origin and currently exists (so t’ata) (?Reality?)? (W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Formation of the Greek Man, 2nd ed. Sao Paulo; Brasilia, DF. : Martins Fontes; Editor Universidade de Brasilia, 1989, p. 135; see also, p. 132). Werner Jaeger, Theology of the First Greek Philosophers, Mexico: Economic Culture Fund, 1992, p. 26ss. ; 198)
[11] Collingwood (1889–1943) says that for the Greeks, natural science was based on the principle that the world of nature is saturated or penetrated by the mind, by understanding. (?) They regarded the world of nature as a world of moving bodies. The movements themselves (?) They were because of vitality, or “soul”; but, they thought, the movement itself is one thing and it orders another. (?) The world of nature was not only alive but intelligent; not only a huge animal endowed with ‘soul’, or a life of its own, but also a rational animal, with ‘spirit’. (R. G. Collingwood, Science and Philosophy, 5th ed. Lisbon: Editorial Presenca, (1986), p. 9-10).
[12] Johannes Hirschberger, History of Philosophy in Antiquity, 2. ed. Sao Paulo: Herder, 1969, p. 29; Hirschberger’s statement was inspired, among other things, by Jaeger. See: Werner Jaeger, Paideia, p. 135; Werner Jaeger, Theology of the First Greek Philosophers, p. 27).
[13] See: William Friar, History of Philosophy I: Greece and Rome, 3rd ed. Madrid: La Editorial Católica, S. A. , 1971, (Library of Christian Authors), p. 139.
[14] Ernst Cassirer, Philosophical Anthropology, 2nd ed. Sao Paulo: Mestre Jou, 1977, p. 19.
[15] Plato, Fedro, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Tecnoprint, (s. f. ), 245. p. 224.
[16] Aristotle, Poetics, Sao Paulo: Cultural April, 1973. (Thinkers, v. 4), VII, 1450 b 26, p. 449. Abbagnano has the meaning of the term?Principle, said Aristotle. (See: N. Abbagnano, Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. Sao Paulo: Mestre Jou, 1982, p. 760). See also: Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Prolegomena, Sao Paulo: Cultura Crist, 2012, v. 1, 211.
[17] Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatic: Prolegomena, v. 1, p. 211
[18] Rudolf Eisler, Handworterbuch der Philosophy, Apud L. Berkhof, Introduction to Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Michigan: TELL, (1973), p. 95 (See R’s work for more details. Eisler Handworterbuch der Philosophy, tickets: Kausalitet and Prinzip. Available at: https://archive. org/details/eislershandwrte00fregoog/page/n187/mode/2up (p. 497) -498) (see 28 June 2020).
[19] For a more detailed examination of the concept of principle and its classifications, see: William Fleming, The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical, 2. Ed. New York: Sheldon
[20] See Principle: In: José Ferrater Mora, Dictionary of Philosophy, v. 3, 2371.
[21] How did Augustine say: Reality is what is in itself (?) Is it?(Agostinho, Solil-quios, Sao Paulo: Paulinas, 1993, II. 5. 8. P. 76-77).
[22] He’s nothing, because he’s not. The positive statement we can make about it is that it’s the absence of the thing. If the absence of the thing had content, nothing would be known. Nothing can only be affirmed from the negative. So nothing. is it nadified in itself? Gasoline, you’re welcome.
[23] William Fleming, Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mind, Morals and Metaphysics, 2. Ed. New York: Sheldon
[24] I have discussed this topic elsewhere: Hermisten M. P. Costa, Introduction to the Methodology of Theological Sciences, Goiania, GO . : Editora Cruz, 2015, p. 83-110.
[25] See: Principle: In: A. Lalande, Vocabular Technician and Philosophy Critic, Sao Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1993, p. 861.
[26] On hypotheses, see: Hermisten M. P. Costa, Introduction to the Methodology of Theological Sciences, Goiania, GO . : Editora Cruz, 2015, p. 73-82.