In this article Craig presents a version of the cosmological argument in favor of the existence of God and, on the basis of two philosophical arguments and two scientific confirmations, demonstrates that it is plausible that the universe has had a beginning, since everything that begins to exist has a cause, there must be a transcendent cause for the universe. The book? In Guarda? It presents this argument and many others in a simple and didactic way, we recommend it to anyone who wants to start on the subject.
Dr. William Lane Craig holds a Ph. D. de the University of Birmingham, England, and the University of Munich, Germany.
- Below is an article by William Lane Craig on this plot.
- The text was translated and adapted by Wagner K.
- And taken from the apologia.
- Com.
- Br.
- Click to enlarge.
“The first question that should certainly be asked,” writes GWFLeibiniz, why is there anything instead?1. This question seems to have a profound existential force, which has been perceived by some of humanity’s greatest thinkers. According to Aristotle, Philosophy begins with a sense of wonder for the world, and the deepest question a man can ask is related to the origin of the universe. 2 In his biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein said he sometimes had some experience that could be best described by saying that when I have it, I am amazed at the existence of the world. That’s why I’m inclined to use phrases like “Is it something extraordinary?”3 Similarly, a contemporary philosopher observes, ?? I often think of the immense importance this issue has for me; that something exists in some way seems to me to be a subject of the deepest fear.
Why is there anything instead of anything? Leibiniz answered this question by arguing that something exists instead of anything because there is a necessary being who carries with him his reason for existence and is reason sufficient for the existence of any contingent being.
If Leibiniz (followed by some contemporary philosophers) considered the absence of a necessary being to be logically impossible, a more modest explanation of the need for existence is called “factual necessity”. It was provided by John Hick: a necessary being is an eternal, undestructive, indestructible, and incorruptible being. 6Leibiniz, of course, identified being necessary as God. However, his critics questioned this identification, arguing that the material universe could receive the status of a necessary being. Asked Hume, “Could it not be” that the material universe is the necessary Ent, according to this supposed explanation of the need “7 This was precisely the position of the atheist. The atheists did not feel compelled to accept the idea that the universe was born out of nowhere for no reason; instead, they regarded the universe itself as a kind of necessary reality: the universe is eternal, unspeakable, indestructible, and incorruptible. As Russell made clear: “The universe is here, and that’s it?
Therefore, Leibniz’s argument leaves us in a rational impasse, or is there no more resources available to unravel the mystery of the world’s existence?I think they exist. We remember that an essential property of a necessary being is eternity. So, if it can be proven plausible that the universe began to exist and is therefore not eternal, so far the superiority of theism could be demonstrated as a rational worldview.
Thus, there is a form of cosmological argument very neglected today, but of great historical importance, which aims precisely to show that the universe had a beginning in time9. Based on the efforts of Christian theologians to disprove the Greek doctrine of eternity. From the matter, this argument was developed in sophisticated formulations by Jewish and Islamic theologians, who then transmitted it to the Latin West. The argument therefore has a broad cross-sectoral appeal, having been defended by Muslims, Jews and Christians, Catholics and Protestants.
The argument, which I called kalam’s cosmological argument, can be demonstrated as follows:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence
2. The universe began to exist.
2. 1. Argument based on the impossibility of infinite reality.
2. 11. A true infinite cannot exist
2. 12 An infinite temporary return of events is an infinite real one.
2. 13. Therefore, there can be no feedback of events in infinite time.
2. 2. Argument based on the impossibility of forming a real infinity by successive addition.
2. 21 A collection of successive additions cannot be truly infinite
2. 22 The time series of past events is a collection of successive additions.
2. 23 Therefore, a chronological series of past events cannot be truly infinite.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause for its existence
Let’s take a closer look at this argument.
Clearly, the crucial premise of this argument is (2), and two independent arguments are proposed in support. Then we will proceed to examine the arguments that underpin it.
To understand (2. 1), we need to understand the difference between infinite potential and infinite reality. Basically, infinite potential is a collection that pushes infinity as a limit, but never succeeds. Such a collection is truly indefinite, not infinite. The symbol of this type of infinity, which is used in the calculation is. A true infinity is a collection in which the number of members is truly infinite. The collection does not grow towards infinity, it is infinite, it is “complete”. The symbol of this type of infinity, which is used in set theory to designate sets that have an infinite number of members, such as ‘1,2,3,?’, Is However, (2. 11) does not hold that an infinite potential number cannot exist, but that a real infinite number of things cannot exist, because if there can be a real number of things , all sorts of absurdity would be generated.
Perhaps the best way to highlight the truth of (2. 11) is by illustration. Let me use one of my favorites, the Hilbert Hotel, a brainchild of the great German mathematician David Hilbert. Imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose further that all rooms are occupied. When a new guest arrives to request a room, the owner apologizes: “Sorry, all rooms are taken. ” But imagine a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and again assume that all rooms are occupied. There is not a single empty room in the entire Infinite Hotel. So let’s say a new guest shows up to request a room. ?But of course!? says the owner, and immediately transfers the person from room 1 to room 2, person from room 2 to 3, person from room 3 to 4, and so on ad infinitum. After this room change, room number 1 was left empty and the new customer is gratefully checking in. But remember, before your arrival, all the rooms were taken! Just as curious, according to mathematicians, there are now more people in the hotel than before: the number is simply infinite. But how can this happen? Did the owner just add the new guest’s name to the registry and give them their keys? How not to have one more person in the hotel than before? But the situation gets even stranger. Suppose an infinite number of new customers appear at the counter to request rooms. ? Of course of course !? says the owner, and proceeds to move the person from room 1 to room 2, the person from room 2 to room 4, the person from room 3 to room 6, and so on, always placing to each original occupant in a room twice your number. As a result, all the odd-numbered rooms will be left empty and the infinite number of new guests will easily be accommodated. However, before their arrival, all the rooms were occupied! And again, interestingly enough, the number of hotel guests is the same after countless new registered customers, even though there have been as many new customers as old ones. In fact, the owner could repeat this process over and over again, and yet there would never be a single additional guest in the hotel than before.
But Hilbert’s hotel is even stranger than the German mathematician proved. Suppose some of the guests start to leave. Suppose the guest in room 1 leaves. Is there one less person in the hotel now? Not according to mathematicians? But ask the woman who makes the beds! Suppose the guests in rooms 1, 3, 5 ,? Come on. In this case, an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to mathematicians, aren’t there less people in the hotel? But don’t talk to the washerwoman! In fact, we could force all guests to leave the hotel and repeat this process over and over again, and there would be even fewer people in the hotel. But instead, suppose the people in rooms 4, 5, 6,? Come on. In a single strip, the hotel would be practically empty, the guest registry would be reduced to three names, and infinity would become finite. And yet, would it still be true that this time they left the same number of guests as in rooms 1, 3, 5 ,? left. Can anyone sincerely believe that such a hotel can really exist? These kinds of absurdities illustrate the impossibility of having an infinite real number of things.
This brings us to (2. 12). The truth of this premise seems clearly obvious, if the universe never began to exist, there have been an infinite number of previous events before, so a series of events without beginning in time implies the existence of an infinite real number of things, which is, of past events.
At this point, it may be helpful to consider some objections that may arise against the argument. Consider first the objections to (2. 11). Wallace Matson objects that the premise must mean that a real infinite number of things is logically impossible; but it is easy to show that such a collection is logically possible. For example, the series of negative numbers {? -3, -2, -1} is a true infinite collection without a first member10. Matson’s mistake is to think that (2. 11) means to affirm the logical impossibility of a real infinite number of things. What the premise expresses is the real or factual impossibility of an infinite real. To illustrate the difference between logical possibility and real possibility: there is no logical impossibility that something exists without a cause, but such a circumstance may well be impossible in a real or metaphysical way. Likewise, (2. 11) affirms that the absurdities resulting from the real existence of a real infinity show that such an existence is metaphysically impossible. Therefore, it can be assumed that in the conceptual field of mathematics it is possible, given certain conventions and axioms, to speak consistently of infinite series of numbers, but in no case does this imply only a real number. infinity of things is really possible. It can also be observed that the mathematical school of intuitionism even denies that the series of numbers is really infinite (they consider it potentially infinite only), so appealing to the series of numbers as examples of real infinities is a procedure. controversial.
The late JL Mackie also objected (2. 11), stating that absurdity is resolved by noting that for infinite ensembles the axiom “Is the whole larger than its parts?”, This is not valid, as is the case with finished sets. 11Smith comments that once it is understood that an infinite whole has its own subset with the same number of members as the whole itself, supposedly absurd situations become “perfectly believable. “But I think it’s precisely this characteristic of the theory of infinite ensembles. which, played for the kingdom, produces perfectly incredible results, such as the Hotel de Hilbert. Moreover, not all absurdity stems from the denial of the theory of the infinite sets of Euclid’s axiom: the absurdity illustrated by the departure of hotel guests stems from result when subtraction or reverse division operations are performed using transfinis numbers. Here, the problem of a real infinite collection of things becomes decisive.
Finally, we can raise the objection of Sorabji, who maintains that illustrations such as Hilbert’s Hotel do not contain absurdities. To understand what is wrong with the kalam argument, he asks us to imagine two parallel columns starting at the same point and extending an infinite distance, a column of years past and another column of days past. The reason the past days column is not bigger than the past years column, says Sorajbi, is the days column wrong? in addition to the far end of the other column, because no column has a far end. In the case of the Hilbert Hotel, there is a temptation to think that an unfortunate person residing in the background will fall into space. But there is no distant end: the resident line will not extend beyond the end of the room line. Once this is understood, the product is simply an explainable truth, surprising and encouraging as it is? about infinity 13. Now Sorajbi is certainly right, as we have seen, that the Hilbert Hotel illustrates an explainable truth about the nature of real infinity. If there could be a truly infinite number of things, the Hilbert Hotel would be possible. But Sorajbi does not seem to understand the essence of the paradox: I do not see, for example, the temptation to think of people falling to the back of the hotel, because there are none, but I find it hard to believe that a hotel where all the rooms are they are busy can accommodate more customers. Of course, the guest range won’t extend beyond the room range, but if all those endless rooms already have guests, then can moving those guests really create empty rooms? Sorajbi’s own illustration of the past years and days columns bothers me no less: if we divide the columns into foot-sized segments and mark one column as years and the other as days, then one column is as much as the other. And yet, for every foot-sized segment in the years column, 365 segments of the same size are in the days column! These paradoxical results can only be avoided if collections of real infinities can only exist in the imagination and not in reality. In any case, the illustration of Hilbert’s Hotel is not exhausted by dealing only with the incorporation of new clients, because the loss of clients leads to even more intractable absurdities. Sorajbi’s analysis does nothing to solve them. Therefore, it seems to me that objections to premise (2. 11) are less plausible than the premise itself.
As for (2. 12), the most common objection is that the past should be seen as a potential infinity only, not as a real infinity. Such was Aquino’s position against Buenaventura, and the contemporary philosopher Charles Hartshorne seems to align himself with Thomas at this point. 14 However, such a position is unsustainable. The future is potentially infinite, since it does not exist; but the past is real in a way that the future is not, as evidenced by the fact that we have traces of the past in the present, but not traces of the future. So, if the series of past events never began to exist, then there must have been an infinite real number of past events.
Therefore, the objections to both premises seem less convincing than the premises themselves, and together they imply that the universe began to exist. Therefore, I conclude that this argument provides good reasons to accept the truth of premise (2) that the universe came into existence.
The second argument (2. 2) in favor of the beginning of the universe is based on the impossibility of forming a real infinity through successive additions, this argument differs from the first in that it does not negate the possibility of the existence of a real infinity, but the possibility of it being formed by successive addition.
The premise (2. 21) is the crucial stage of the argument. A true infinite collection of things cannot be formed by adding one member after another. As it is always possible to add one more before reaching infinity, it is impossible to reach real infinity. This is sometimes referred to as the impossibility of “counting infinitely”or “crossing infinity”. It is important to understand that this impossibility has nothing to do with the time available: it is part of the nature of infinity that cannot be formed like this.
It can be said that if you cannot form an infinite collection starting with a period and then adding members, however, you could form an infinite collection without any beginning, but ending at one point, that is, ending at one point after one member after another out but this method seems even more amazing than the first method. If it is not possible to count to infinity, how is it possible to count backwards from infinity?If it is not possible to cross infinity in one direction, how is it possible to cross it simply by moving in the opposite direction?
In fact, the idea of an unfinished series and ending in the present seems absurd. To give one example: suppose we meet a man who claims to have counted to eternity and now ends:?, -3, -2, -1. 0. You might wonder why he didn’t finish counting yesterday or the day before or last year, by then would he have spent an infinite time, so it should have ended at that time, so at no point in the infinite past could we find man completing his account, because at that moment it should be over!In fact, no matter how far back in time we can never find the man who finishes the account, because by the time we reach him, but if at some point in the past we can find him counting [to the end], he contradicts the assumption that he counted for eternity. This illustrates the fact that the formation of a real infinity by consecutive sum is also impossible if one does so up to or from infinity.
The premise (2. 22) assumes a dynamic view of the time during which events run in series, one after the other. The series of events is not a type of eternally surviving world line that appears successively in consciousness, but the becoming is real and essential This vision of time is not without challenges, but given its objections it would take us far away. 15 At the moment, we must be content with the fact that we argue on a common ground with our ordinary intuitions of temporality. transformation and according to many contemporary philosophers of time and space.
Given the truths of (2. 21) and (2. 22), the conclusion (2. 23) is logically followed: if the universe had not begun to exist in a finite time, then the present moment could never have come, but it obviously happened. Therefore, we know that the universe ended in the past and began to exist.
Again, it will be useful to consider several objections that have been raised against this reasoning. Against (2. 21), Mackie objects that the argument improperly takes an infinitely distant starting point in the past and then claims that it is impossible to travel from that point to today. But there would be no starting point in the infinite past, not even infinitely distant. Still, from any point in the infinite past, there is only a finite distance to the present16. However, it seems to me that Mackie’s claim that the argument presupposes an infinitely remote starting point is without foundation. The characteristic that the series has no beginning only increases the difficulty of forming by cumulative sum. The fact that there is no beginning, not even infinitely distant, makes the problem more, not less, worrisome. And the fact that at any time in the infinite past you have only a finite temporal distance from the present can be dismissed as irrelevant. The question is not how you can form a finite part of a time series, but how you can form an infinite series. If Mackie thinks that because each segment of the series can be formed by cumulative sum, the entire series can be formed, then he is simply making the mistake of composition.
Sorajbi similarly objects that the reason it is impossible to count backwards from infinity is that counting by nature involves taking an initial number, which in this case is missing. But completing an infinite number of years does not imply any initial year and is therefore possible17. However, this answer is clearly insufficient, because, as we have seen, the years of an infinite past could be counted with negative numbers, which in the case of a complete infinite number of years actually implies a countdown from infinity. Sorajbi, however, anticipates this objection and asserts that such a countdown is possible in principle and has therefore not passed any logical barrier for an infinite number of years. Yet again, the question I ask myself is not whether there is a logical contradiction in such thinking, but whether such a count is not metaphysically absurd. Because we have seen that such a count could never be completed. But Sorajbi still has a ready answer: To say that counting must never end confuses the counting of an infinite number of years with the counting of all numbers. At any time in the past, the Eternal Counter will have counted an infinite number of numbers, but this does not imply that he will have counted all negative numbers. I don’t think the argument makes this claim incorrect, and it can be clarified by examining why our eternal accountant is supposed to be able to finish counting negative numbers that end in zero. To justify the possibility of this intuitively impossible feat, the opponent’s argument uses the correspondence principle used in set theory to determine whether two sets are equivalent (that is, they have the same number of members) by comparing members of one with members from the other group and vice versa. On the basis of this principle, the opponent holds that since the accountant has lived, say, an infinite number of years and the set of past years can be placed in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of negative numbers, it follows that By counting a number per year, an eternal accountant would finish counting negative numbers for the current year. If we asked why the accountant could not finish next year or in a hundred years, the opponent would answer that before the current year an infinite number of years would have elapsed, therefore, by the principle of correspondence, all numbers should already be have been counted now. But this reasoning works against the opponent: because, as we have seen, in this explanation the counter should have finished counting all the numbers at any time in the past, because there is a one-to-one correspondence between the numbers. years in the past and negative numbers. So there is no mistake between counting an infinite number and counting all numbers. However, at this point a deeper nonsense arises: Suppose there is another counter that counts at the rate of a negative number per day. According to the correspondence principle, which underlies infinite set theory and transfinite arithmetic, the two eternal counters will complete their counts at the same time, even if one is counting at a rate 365 times faster than the other. ! Can anyone believe that these scenarios can, in fact, be obtained in reality, instead of representing the product of an imaginary game played in a purely conceptual sphere according to adopted logical conventions and axioms?
Regarding the premise (2. 22), many thinkers have objected that it is not necessary to consider the past as an infinite series without beginning or end in the present. Popper, for example, admits that the set of all past events is truly infinite, but the series of past events is potentially infinite. This can be seen from the present and by numbering the events in reverse, thus forming an infinite potential. Therefore, the problem of an infinite real being formed by successive sums does not appear18. Similarly, Swinburne believes that it is doubtful that an infinite complete series with no beginning but ending makes sense, but offers to solve the problem starting from the present and working up to the past, so that the series of past events unfolds. it has no end and, therefore, would be a complete infinity19. This objection, however, clearly confuses the mental countdown with the actual progression of the time series of the events themselves. Numbering the series backward from the present only shows that if there are an infinite number of past events, then we can number an infinite number of past events. But the problem is: how was this infinite collection of events formed by successive sums? As we mentally conceive it, the series in no way affects the ontological character of the series itself as a series without a beginning, but with an end, or, in other words, as a real infinity completed by successive additions. .
Again, objections to (2. 21) and (2. 22) appear less plausible than the premises themselves. Together, they involve (2. 23), that is, the universe began to exist.
These purely philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe received extraordinary confirmation from the discoveries in astronomy and astrophysics of the 20th century, confirmations that can be summarized in two points: the confirmation of the expansion of the universe and the confirmation of the thermodynamic properties of the universe. .
With regard to the former, Hubble’s discovery in 1929 of the red-to-red run in the light of distant galaxies initiated a revolution in astronomy perhaps as important as the Copernican revolution. Before that, the universe as a whole was conceived as static; But the impressive conclusion Hubble reached was that the red run is due to the fact that the universe is actually expanding. The incredible implication of this fact is that if we track expansion over time, the universe becomes denser and denser until it reaches the point of infinite density, from which the universe began to expand. The conclusion of Hubble’s discovery is that at some point in the past ended, probably 15 billion years ago, the entire universe contracted at a simple mathematical point that marked the origin of this initial explosion was called the “Big Bang”. Four of the world’s most eminent astronomers have described such an event as follows:
Did the universe start from a state of infinite density? In this event space and time were created and also all the matter of the universe, it makes no sense to ask what happened before the Big Bang, it is like asking what is the north of the North Pole, so it is not prudent to ask where the Big Bang was. The point universe was not an isolated object in space; it was the whole universe, so the answer can only be that the Big Bang started everywhere. 20
This event that marked the beginning of the universe becomes more impressive when reflected in the fact that a state of “infinite density” is synonymous with “nothing”. There can be no object that has infinite density, because if it was any size, it could be even denser, so, as Cambridge astronomer Fred Hoyle has pointed out, the Big Bang theory requires the creation of matter from scratch. go back in time, you get to the point where, in Hoyle’s words, the universe has been “reduced to nothing. “So what seems to demand the Big Bang model is that the universe began to exist and was created from scratch.
Some theorists have tried to avoid the absolute beginning of the universe implicit in the Big Bang theory by speculating that the universe may have gone through an endless series of expansions and contractions. However, there are good reasons to question the suitability of such an oscillating model of the universe: (i) the oscillating model seems physically impossible. Despite all the talk about these models, the point seems to be that they are only theoretically possible, but probably not. As the late Yale Professor Tinsley explains, in oscillating models, although mathematicians say that the universe oscillates, there is no known physics to reverse the collapse and jump into further expansion. Does it seem like physicists are saying that these models start from the Big Bang, expand, collapse, and then end? 22. For the oscillating model to be correct, it appears that the known physical laws would have to be revised. (ii) The oscillating model appears to be remarkably indefensible. Two facts from observational astronomy seem to contradict the oscillating model. First, the observed homogeneity of the distribution of matter in the universe seems inexplicable in an oscillating model. During the contraction phase of such a model, black holes begin to swallow surrounding matter, resulting in an uneven distribution of matter. But no mechanism is known to resolve this inhomogeneity in the next expansion phase. Therefore, the homogeneity of matter observed throughout the universe remains unexplained. Second, the density of the universe appears to be insufficient for the universe to shrink. For the oscillating model to be possible, the universe needs to be dense enough so that gravity can overcome the force of expansion and pull the universe back. However, according to the best estimates, if you take into account both luminous and non-luminous matter (found in galactic halos) and any contribution of neutrino particles to the total mass, the universe still has that half of what is needed for regeneration. contraction 23. Furthermore, recent work on calculating the velocity and deceleration of expansion confirms that the universe is expanding at what is called “escape velocity. ” and therefore it will no longer contract. According to Sandage and Tammann, “So, are we obliged to conclude this? Does it seem inevitable that the universe unfolds forever? they conclude, therefore, that “the universe only happened once”. 24.
As if that were not enough, there is a second scientific confirmation of the beginning of the universe based on the thermodynamic properties of various cosmological models. According to the second law of thermodynamics, the processes that act in a closed system always tend to be in a state of equilibrium. So our interest is in the implications of this when the law is applied to the universe as a whole. Because the universe is a gigantic closed system, since that is all that exists and that there is no energy flowing out. The second law of thermodynamics seems to imply that, given enough time, the universe will reach a state of thermodynamic equilibrium called “heat death. ” of the universe. This death can be hot or cold, depending on whether the universe expands forever or ends up contracting again. On the one hand, if the density of the universe is great enough to overcome the expanding force, then the universe will contract again into a ball of fire. As the universe contracts, stars burn faster until they explode or eventually evaporate. As the universe becomes denser, black holes begin to gobble up everything around them and clump together until all black holes eventually clump together into a giant black hole equal in size to the universe where it doesn’t. it will never happen again. On the other hand, if the density of the universe is insufficient to stop the expansion, as seems more likely, then the galaxies will convert all their gases into stars and the stars will burn out. In 1030 years, the universe will be composed of 90% dead stars, 9% supermassive black holes, and 1% atomic matter. Elementary particle physics suggests that protons then disintegrate into electrons and positrons, making the rarefied gas-filled space so thin that the distance between an electron and a positron will be the size of today’s galaxy. In 10 100 years, some scientists believe that black holes themselves will dissipate into radiation and elementary particles. Eventually, all matter in the cold, dark, constantly expanding universe will be reduced to an ultrathin gas of elementary particles and radiation. Equilibrium will prevail and the entire universe will reach the final state, where no change will occur.
The question to answer is: if, given enough time, the universe will reach heat death, then why is it not now in a heat death state if it has existed for an infinite time? If the universe did not begin to exist, it should now be in a state of equilibrium. Some theorists have suggested that the universe escapes final heat death by oscillating from the eternal past to the eternal future. But we have already seen that such a model seems physically and visibly impractical. But even if we avoid such considerations and imagine that the universe oscillates, the point is that the thermodynamic properties of this model involve the very beginning of the universe that its supporters are trying to avoid. Because the thermodynamic properties of an oscillating model are such that the universe expands more and more with each successive cycle. So when you track the expansions over time, they get smaller and smaller. As one scientific team explains, “Will the effect of entropy production be to expand the cosmic scale from one cycle to another? So, looking back, each cycle generated less entropy, had a shorter cycle time, and had a factor of 25 Novikov and Zeldovich, from the Institute of Applied Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, therefore conclude: “The multiple cycle model has an infinite future, but only a finite past” 26. As another author, the Therefore, the oscillating model of the universe always requires an origin of the universe before the smallest cycle27.
Therefore, for any scenario someone chooses for the future of the universe, thermodynamics implies that the universe began to exist. According to the physicist PCDavies, the universe must have been created a while ago and is coming to an end. The universe just didn’t exist. Therefore, Davies concludes, even if we do not like it, we have to conclude that the energy of the universe was somehow simply “placed” in creation as an initial condition 28.
So we have scientific and philosophical confirmations for the beginning of the universe. On this basis, I believe that we are largely justified in concluding by the truth of the premise (2) that the universe has come into existence.
The premise (1) seems to me to be relatively unconvincing, is based on the metaphysical intuition that something cannot arise from nowhere, so any argument in favour of the principle is necessarily less obvious than the principle itself. has admitted that he has never made a proposal as absurd as something can be born without cause; He simply denied that someone could prove the clearly true causal principle. 29 With regard to the universe, if there was nothing originally, neither God, nor space, nor time, then how could the universe exist?The truth of the principle of ex nihilo adjustment, nihil is so obvious that I think we are right to abandon an elaborate defence of the first premise of the argument.
However, some thinkers, in trying to avoid the theism implicit in this premise in the current context, felt compelled to deny their truth. To avoid his theist conclusions, Davies presents a scenario in which he admits that “it should not be taken too seriously”but that seems to have a strong appeal to Davies. 30 Refers to a quantum theory of gravity according to which space-time itself could lead to the non-causal existence of absolutely nothing. While he admits that “there is nothing satisfactory quantum theory of gravity,” such a theory could spontaneously and un causelessly create and destroy space-time in the same way that particles are created and destroyed spontaneously and without cause. The theory would imply a certain mathematical probability that, for example, a space bubble would appear where there was nothing before. So could space-time come out of nowhere as a result of a seedless quantum transition?
In fact, the creation of pairs of particles does not provide an analogy with this radical that becomes ex-nihilo, as Davies seems to suggest. This quantum phenomenon, even if it were an exception at the beginning that every event has a cause, does not provide an analogy for something that arises from nothing. Although physicists refer to this as creating pairs of particles and destroying them, these terms are philosophically misleading, because all that really happens is the conversion of energy into matter or vice versa. As Davies admits, “The process described here does not represent the creation of matter from scratch, but the conversion of a pre-existing energy into a form of matter. “Can they appear out of nowhere without a specific cause?And again: “However, the quantum world physics systematically produces something out of nothing. “On the contrary, the world of quantum physics never produces anything out of nothing.
However, consider the case alone: quantum gravity is understood so poorly that the period before 10-43 seconds that this theory hopes to describe was compared by a funny guy like the regions on the maps of ancient marked cartographers. Are there dragons here?: It can be easily filled with all kinds of fantasies. In fact, there seems to be no good reason to think that such a theory would involve the kind of spontaneous ex-nihile that Davies suggests. A theory of quantum gravity was the goal of providing a theory of gravity based on the exchange of particles (gravitons) rather than the geometry of space, which can lead to a theory of great unification that unies all the forces of nature into a single supersymmetric state in which a fundamental force and there is a simple type of particle. But there doesn’t seem to be anything there to suggest the possibility of becoming a spontaneous ex-nihile.
In fact, it is not entirely clear that Davies’ explanation is even intelligible. What can it mean, for example, to say that there is a mathematical probability that nothing will generate a space-time region?Where didn’t anything exist before? This cannot mean that, in sufficient time, a region of space would jump into existence in a given place, since neither place nor time exists outside of space-time. The notion of a certain probability that something will come out of nowhere seems incoherent.
In that sense, I remember some of the NASBeasure of Jonathan Edwards’ argument against creating something without cause, this would be impossible, Edwards says, because then it would be inexplicable because everything and everything could not or would not exist without cause, because first its existence have no natures that could control its arrival into existence. He previously made a cosmological application of Edwards’ reasoning by commenting on the theory of steady state when he postulates the continuous creation of ex-nihilo hydrogen atoms:
This is not part of Hoyle’s theory that this process has no cause, but I want to define myself better about it and say that if it is without cause, then what is said to have happened is fantastic and incredible. In fact, objects that are actually objects, substances with abilities?they will exist without cause, so it is incredible that they become objects of the same type, that is, hydrogen atoms. The particular nature of hydrogen atoms cannot be what makes this possible for them or for objects of any other nature; because hydrogen atoms do not have this nature until they have it, that is, until their appearance has occurred. That’s Edwards’ argument, in fact, and here it seems pretty convincing?
In this case, if nothing originally existed, why would emptiness spontaneously result in space-time, rather than, say, hydrogen atoms or even rabbits?How can we talk about the likelihood that something in particular will come out of nowhere?
Davies once seemed to answer that the laws of physics are the determining factor in determining what will appear without cause. But which of the laws should be there?At first for the universe to exist. Does quantum physics (in a sense) have to exist for the quantum transition to generate the cosmos in the first place?35 In fact, this seems extremely strange. Davies seems to attribute to the laws of nature a kind of causal and ontological status as they force spontaneous becoming. But this seems clearly misleading: the laws of physics do not provoke or force anything on their own; These are only propositional descriptions of a certain form and generality that occur in the universe. And edwards’ question is why, if there is absolutely nothing, is it true that something instead of something must arise without cause?There is no point in saying that it somehow depends on the nature of space-time to do this, because if there was absolutely nothing, then there would be no nature to determine that such space-time should exist.
But more fundamentally, what Davies certainly foresees is metaphysical nonsense: although his scenario is presented as a scientific theory, he must be brave enough to say that the Emperor is not wearing clothes. Sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of space. time existed or did not exist; if they existed, then it is not true that nothing existed; if they did not exist, then it seems ontologically impossible for something to arise from absolute nothingness. Call spontaneous generation to the existence of nothing?Quantum transition, or attribute it to quantum gravity?That doesn’t nada. de fact, in this theory, there’s no explanation, it just happens.
It seems to me, therefore, that Davies did not provide a plausible basis for denying the truth of the first premise of the cosmological argument: that everything that exists has a cause seems to be an ontologically necessary truth, a truth constantly confirmed in our experience.
Given the truth of premises (1) and (2), it logically follows that (3) the universe must have a cause for its existence. In fact, I think it may be plausible to argue that the cause of the universe must be a personal creator. Because how could a temporary effect come from an eternal cause? If the cause was simply a mechanical and operating set of sufficient and necessary conditions that have existed from eternity, then why would the effect not have existed from eternity? For example, if the cause of the freezing of water is the temperature below zero degrees, then if the temperature has been below zero degrees since eternity, the present water would freeze from eternity. The only way to obtain an eternal cause with a temporary effect would be if the cause were a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect over time. For example, a man sitting in eternity may want to stand up; therefore, a temporary effect can arise from an eternally existing agent. In fact, the agent can create a temporary effect of eternity so that it is not necessary to conceive of any change in the agent. Therefore, we are taken not only to the first cause of the universe, but to its personal Creator.
In conclusion, we have seen on the basis of philosophical arguments and scientific confirmation that it is plausible that the universe had a beginning. Given the intuitively obvious principle that everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence, we are led to conclude that the universe has a cause for its existence, according to our argument, this cause must be causeless, eternal, immutable, timeless, and immaterial; In addition, you must be a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect over time. , on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, I conclude that it is rational to believe that God exists.
1. G. W. Leibniz, “The principles of nature and grace, based on reason”, in Selecciones de Leibniz, ed. Philip P. Wiener, Modern Student Library (New York: Charles Scribner? S Sons, 1951), 527.
2. Aristotle Metaphysica Lambda. L. 982b10-15
3 Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 70.
4. J. J. C. Smart?The existence of God? Church Quarterly Review 156 (1955): 194.
5. G. W. Leibniz, Theodie: Essays on god’s goodness, human freedom and the origin of evil, trad. E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge
6. John Hick?Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960): 733-4
7. David Hume, Dialogues on Natural Religion, ed. , With an introduction written by Norman Kemp Smith, Library of the Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), p. 190.
8. Bertrand Russell and F. C. Copleston, “The Existence of God”, ?in The Existence of God, ed. with an introduction written by John Hick, Problems of Philosophy Series (New York: Macmillan
9. See William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz, Library of Philosophy and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 48-58, 61-76, 98-104, 128-31.
10 Wallace Matson, The Existence of God (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), pages 58-60.
11. J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 93.
12. Quentin Smith, “Infinity and the Past”? Philosophy of Science 54 (1987): 69.
13 Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), pages 213, 222-3.
14 Charles Hartshorne, The Vision of God of Man and the Logic of Theism (Chicago: Willett, Clark,
15 GJWhitrow defends a form of this argument that does not presuppose a dynamic view of time, stating that an infinite past should still exist?Be aware and eternal, even if the series of physical events lasted forever (GJWhitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press [ 1980], pp. 28-32).
16. Mackie, Theism, p. 93
18. K. R. Popper, “On the Possibility of an Infinite Past: An Answer to Whitrow,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978): 47-8.
19. R. G. Swinburne, “The Beginning of the Universe”, The Aristotelian Society40 (1966): 131-2.
20. Richard J. Gott, et. al. , “Will the Universe Expand Forever” Scientific American (March 1976), p. 65.
21 Fred Hoyle, De Stonehenge to modern cosmology (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1972), 36.
23. David N. Schramm and Gary Steigman, “Relic Neutrinos and the Density of the Universe”. Astrophysical Journal 243 (1981): p. 1-7.
24. Alan Sandage and G. A. Tammann, steps towards the Hubble constant. Astrophysic Journal 210 (1976): 23, 7; see also “Steps for the Hubble Constant”. Viii. ? Astrophysical Journal 256 (1982): 339-45.
25. Duane Dicus, et. al. Effects of proton disintegration on the cosmological future. Astrophysical Journal 252 (1982): 1. 8.
26. I. D. Novikov and Ya. B. Zeldovich, physical processes close to cosmological singularities?Annual Journal of Astronomy and Astrophysics 11 (1973): 401-2.
27. John Gribbin, “An Oscillating Universe Bounces”. Nature 259 (1976): 16.
28 PCW Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry (London: Surrey University Press, 1974), p. 104.
(29) David Hume to John Stewart, February 1754, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1: 187.
30 Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 214.
31. Ibid. , 215
32. Ibid. , 31.
34. A. N. Avant, “Limited Indeterminism”, in Papers on Time and Tense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 65.
35. Davies, God, p. 217.